Transnistria: autonomous region or independent state?

Giorgio Colleoni

13 mag 2024Tempo di lettura: 4 min

This article briefly reviews the historical and geopolitical events that led to the declarations of independence of Moldova and Transnistria, the reasons behind Transnistrians’ secessionist ambitions, and the increasingly close relationship between the autonomous region and the Russian Federation. What will be the consequences of Transnistria’s request for Russian help?

Moldova, officially the Republic of Moldova, is a small country in Eastern Europe that is bordered by Romania and Ukraine. It was formerly part of the Soviet Union, under which it was known as Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR). On 27 August 1991, when the dissolution of the USSR was only a matter of time, Moldova declared independence. The country is now a member of the United Nations and the Council of Europe; on 23 June 2022, it gained candidate status for EU membership, together with Ukraine. (BBC News, 2022)

The independence of Moldova was originally fueled by a nationalist sentiment that spread across the territory; claims raised in that period especially focused on the linguistic aspect, as Moldovans refused to accept Russian as the official language instead of Moldovan. Due to these requests, which even led to mass demonstrations, the authorities of MSSR proclaimed in 1989 the Moldovan language written in the Latin script to be the state language of the MSSR (Wikisource, 1989). The move, however, was not enough to prevent the subsequent secession from the Soviet Union that happened a couple of years later.

The mentioned reform was seen as outrageous in the region east of the Dniester River, known as Transnistria, since most of the population was made of East Slavs of Ukrainian and Russian descent, predominantly Russophone. Unexpectedly, the outcry was perceived so severely that led to the declaration of independence of Transnistria on 16 August 1990; the capital was set in the city of Tiraspol. Interestingly, the declaration came a year before Moldova’s one.

In March 1992, clashes between Transnistrian forces, supported by the Russian Army, and Moldovan police that had erupted in winter escalated into a military conflict; the war eventually ended in July with a ceasefire and the establishment of a demilitarized buffer zone supervised by a Joint Control Commission, composed by Moldovans, Transnistrians, and Russians. Since then, the political status of Transnistria remained unresolved; the territory is de iure part of Moldova, but it is de facto an unrecognized independent presidential republic. Currently, every member state of the United Nations recognizes Transnistria as part of Moldova and not as an independent country.

In the following decades, many attempts were made to normalize the relations between the two countries; among the most relevant proposals, the one known as the Kozak memorandum should be mentioned. In 2003, Dmitry Kozak, a counselor to Russian President Vladimir Putin, proposed the creation of an asymmetric federal Moldovan state. The proposal was yet unsuccessful as Transnistria sought equal status with Moldova, while Moldova was dissuaded by OSCE and the US due to the proposed maintenance of Russian military presence as guarantor (Hill, 2021). This failure kept Moldova out of the Russian sphere of influence and progressively pushed the country towards the European Union.

In a September 2006 referendum, unrecognized by Moldova and the international community, Transnistria reasserted its demand for independence (European Parliament, 2006). After the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation in March 2014, the head of Tiraspol parliament expressly asked to join Russia (BBC News, 2014). Transnistrian officials appealed to the Russian Federation to examine the possibility of extending to Trans-Dniester the legislation, at the time under discussion in the State Duma, Russia’s lower House, on granting Russian citizenship and admitting new subjects into Russia.

This precarious geopolitical situation has further deteriorated since the beginning of the War in Ukraine, on 24 February 2022. Referring to the “special operation” in Ukraine, a Russian military commander named Rustam Minnekayev said that “control over southern Ukraine would give yet another point of access to Transnistria, where facts of oppression of the Russian-speaking population have also been observed” (The Guardian, 2022). The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Moldova “expressed deep concern over the statements made by the Russian official” and summoned the Russian ambassador; during the meeting, Moldova’s MFA underlined the country’s neutrality in the conflict. (CNN, 2022)

In recent days, Transnistria’s Congress of Deputies asked Russia to provide it with protection in the face of increasing pressure from Moldova, given that “more than 220,000 Russian citizens permanently reside in the region” (New York Times, 2024). The act caused widespread concern among the international community, as something very similarhappened in the de facto autonomous regions of eastern Ukraine and was used by Moscow to justify the invasion.

Russian officials have publicly denied any intention to provide further military assistance to Transnistria, which would be in addition to the estimated 1500 soldiers based in the region to maintain the peace and to protect the Cobasna ammunition depot, which is believed to be one of the largest weapons’ deposits in Eastern Europe. (Deutsche Welle, 2015)

The real intentions of Transnistrian officials remain obscure, as much as President Putin’s plans. Some analysts believe that an annexation to the Russian Federation is highly unlikely, since Transnistria lies between Ukraine and Moldova, both hostile to Moscow. Reasonably, the purpose of the help request was the destabilization of the current government of Moldova, which has close ties with the West and harsh relations with Russia. (New York Times, 2024)