The framework of the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the constant failure of Iran to abide by it.
The Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into effect in 1970, aims to “prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy”. This treaty formalizes the division between nuclear and non-nuclear weapon states. Specifically, under the treaty non-nuclear-weapon parties agree not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or explosives, and nuclear-weapon parties agree not to assist or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons or other explosives (The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 2016). Under Article III of the NPT, each non-nuclear weapon state party is obligated to conclude a bilateral comprehensive safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is
the world’s center for nuclear cooperation, ensuring the secure and peaceful use of nuclear technology through the utilization of verification methods including monitoring and on-site inspections (IAEA Secretariat, 2015). However, voluntary allowance from state parties is necessary for the IAEA to carry out these activities (Safeguards Agreements 2016).
Despite the IAEA's efforts to strengthen its safeguards system and complement gaps in its agreements with additional protocols, there are still several non-proliferation compliance issues. One interesting case is that of Iran (Major challenges currently facing the International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime 2003). The Islamic Republic of Iran has failed to meet some of its obligations under the NPT safeguards agreement. Particularly it has failed to report many of its nuclear-related activities, the existence of new nuclear facilities and materials, specifically uranium, and it has congested access of the IAEA to its nuclear facilities for inspections as required under the NPT ( Foreign, C. & D. O., 2023).
In 2003, Iran signed an Additional Protocol to grant more information and more access to the IAEA, however, it did not comply with it throughout all of the past years (Iran and the Additional Protocol). In fact, in December 2020, Iran’s Parliament passed a new law stopping any IAEA inspections unless U.S. sanctions were lifted and in 2021, Iran formally suspended the Additional Protocol and refused all requests from the IAEA (Masterson, 2023). Additionally, a new safeguards issue arose in 2023, when Iran made changes in one of its nuclear plants and possessed much more uranium than what it had declared. After that Iran made a Joint Statement where it pledged to cooperate with the IAEA, however, it has still not done so (Intern, 2023). Therefore, it can be observed that over the years, Iran has been
constantly showcasing a stance against cooperation and against transparency for its nuclear activities.
With the recent developments, following Iran’s drone and missile attack as a retaliation to the killing of two civilians, there have been rising concerns regarding Iran’s disobedience in nuclear non-proliferation and regarding the possibility of nuclear attacks between the two states. There have also been talks about the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the NPT altogether, and as also mentioned in the Financial Times, Iran has warned that it might review its peaceful nuclear stance if its atomic facilities are threatened by Israel (Iran warns of shift in nuclear stance if Israel threatens atomic sites, 2024).
According to Raphael S. Cohen it is essential for Europe and the U.S. to convince Iran to allow for the monitoring of its nuclear program in order to avoid a war in the Middle East (Cohen, 2024). Hence, it can be understood through the case of Iran that international agreements are not sufficient if not enforced or as long as their enforcement is not advocated conjointly by other countries, as peace is a collective matter.
Bibliography
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Cohen, R. S. (2024, April 22). The Iran-israel war is just getting started. Foreign Policy.
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/04/22/israel-iran-attack-war-retaliation-escalation/. Accessed 22 April 2024
Foreign, C. & D. O. (2023, September 14). NPT Safeguards Agreement with Iran: International joint statement at IAEA Board of governors. GOV.UK.
https://www.gov.uk/government/news/international-joint-statement-at-iaea-board-of-governors-on-nptsafeguards-agreement-with-iran. Accessed 22 April 2024
IAEA Secretariat. (2015). 2015 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. UN. Accessed 22 April 2024
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https://www.iaea.org/topics/safeguards-agreements. Accessed 22 April 2024
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https://www.iaea.org/topics/non-proliferation-treaty. Accessed 22 April 2024
Intern. (2023, June 1). Analysis of the IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - may 2023: Institute for Science and International Security. Analysis of the IAEA’s Iran NPT Safeguards Report - May 2023 | Institute for Science and International Security.
https://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/analysis-of-the-iaeas-iran-npt-safeguards-report-may-2023. Accessed 22 April 2024
Iran warns of shift in nuclear stance if Israel threatens atomic sites. (2024, April 18).
https://www.ft.com/content/c73b99ec-cd3f-49be-8024-6faf369b58e1. Accessed 22 April 2024
Masterson, K. D. and J. (2023, January 12). Explainer: Problems for IAEA monitoring in Iran. The Iran Primer. https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2021/nov/29/explainer-problems-iaea-monitoring-iran. Accessed 22 April 2024
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