Introduction and historical background
China’s northwestern region of Xinjiang is home to more than eleven million Uyghurs, a Turkic-speaking ethnic group mostly composed of Muslims which has been practicing Islam for a number of centuries. As it is located along the ancient Silk Road, Xinjiang has frequently been the scene of cross-migration by various minorities; indeed, a host of other ethnic groups live in the region as well. The Uyghurs represented the majority group in 1933, when they declared the independence of East Turkestan, whose army, however, would soon be crushed by Chinese nationalists.
In 1944, Soviet support made the second declaration of independence possible. Five years later, nevertheless, Joseph Stalin agreed to East Turkestan’s annexation by the new communist China. Since then, there has been a gradual decrease in the once majority population, as hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of Muslim individuals (including Uyghurs) migrated to other countries, mainly in Central Asia (Regencia, 2021).
Beijing’s firm belief that China has an ancient claim to the region has been heavily refuted by the Uyghurs, who affirm that Xinjiang’s borders have been modified on several occasions according to the dominant power. Moreover, it should be noted that the region’s name means “new frontier”. Hence, as noted by Dru Gladney, an expert in Uyghur studies, “the very name suggests that it’s new to China, and its own history shows that the region was rarely completely under Chinese control” (Regencia, 2021).
Although Xinjiang still formally holds the status of autonomous region and it should thus enjoy some powers of self-governance, severe restrictions have been imposed on it over the decades by the central government, similarly to Tibet (BBC, 2021).
Muslim minorities in north-western China were already the target of harsh repression between the 1950s and the 1970s, when mosques and cemeteries were destroyed, Qurans were burned and various Muslim customs and traditions were banned. Starting from the 1990s, after the East Turkestan Islamic Movement engaged in violent activities with the aim of creating the independent state of East Turkestan, Beijing reacted with a gradual crackdown on the minority.
The Uyghur community also claims that hundreds of peaceful protesters were killed by Chinese soldiers in the Gulja massacre of 1997. Moreover, hostilities between Uyghurs and Han Chinese caused the death of 14 people and left dozens injured in 2011. Tensions between the two ethnic groups have grown significantly over the last decades as the central government has favored the resettlement of millions of Han Chinese to Xinjiang, leading them to become the second-largest ethnic group in the area (Regencia, 2021) (Gunter, Uyghur imams targeted in China's Xinjiang crackdown, 2021).
Ever since the terrorist attacks of 2001 happened in the USA, the Chinese government has justified its treatment of the Uyghur minority as an effort to tackle the “three evils” of international terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Beijing de facto considers any expression of Islam in the north-western region as extremist, and the Communist leadership is trying to force all religions to abide by party doctrines and Han customs (Maizland, 2021).
Surveillance and persecution
The current wave of repression started in 2014, after China’s President Xi Jinping instructed local officials to react to violent acts by Uyghur separatists with “absolutely no mercy” and to use the tools of “dictatorship” to eliminate extremism (Hill, Campanale, & Gunter, 2021) (Maizland, 2021). The Chinese government has imprisoned or detained at least 630 Muslim religious figures since then, while 18 of them died shortly. Imams are typically detained simply as a consequence of their routine activities, including preaching and leading prayer groups. Available court documents reveal that an astonishing 96% of the imams imprisoned so far were sentenced to five years or more, while 26% to at least 20 years, of which 14 were sentenced to death. These tragic numbers, however, most likely represent only a small part of the actual persecutions faced by religious figures (Gunter, Uyghur imams targeted in China's Xinjiang crackdown, 2021).
Repression has been enhanced dramatically in Xinjiang since 2017, when a surveillance state started being implemented through the use of cutting-edge technology. The Communist party divided every city in the area into squares of approximately five hundred people through a grid-management system, which allows to continuously scan the inhabitants’ identification cards and track their movements through countless camera monitors. Moreover, local police routinely take photographs and fingerprints from Muslim residents and search their cell phones.
Many Communist Party members have been relocated to the area and tasked with reporting any type of extremist behavior, which includes fasting during Ramadan. In addition, reports reveal that thousands of mosques have been demolished, traditional Muslim names and customs have been forbidden and the party has also made Halal food difficult to find, sometimes forcing Muslims to eat pork and drink alcoholic beverages (Maizland, 2021).
Even more shockingly, human rights groups report that the central government is imposing birth-control policies on minority groups including Uyghurs in the hope of cutting 2.6–4.5 million births in 20 years. These policies consist of forced sterilizations and intrauterine device insertions, as well as threats of detention to couples that have too many children. As a consequence, a dramatic fall in the birth rate has been recorded in Xinjiang over the past few years (Regencia, 2021) (Maizland, 2021).
Detention camps
Starting from 2017, a major role has been played by detention centers, whose existence was recognized by Beijing in 2018 under the name of “vocational education and training programs” (Maizland, 2021). Leaked government documents reveal that more than fifteen thousand people entered them in just one week in June 2017, while 39 centers recorded a three-fold increase in size between April 2017 and August 2018. As of early 2021, experts believe that more than one million Muslims (mainly Uyghurs, but also ethnic Kazakhs and Uzbeks) have been detained in hundreds of camps throughout Xinjiang. The vast majority of detainees have never been formally charged with crimes and they are held for indeterminate periods of time in which they are not allowed to challenge the decision. Apparently, the actual reasons for their imprisonments include travelling to or contacting people from one of 26 blacklisted countries, attending mosques, sending text messages with verses from the Quran, and having more than three children (Maizland, 2021).
Some information on the camps is available thanks to the accounts of a former guard and detainees. Prisoners are obliged to pledge their loyalty to the Chinese Communist Party, to renounce their religion, and to learn Mandarin; meanwhile, widespread cameras and microphones monitor all their activities. Detainees are the victims of a system of mass torture and sexual abuse, including rape especially in the case of women (Maizland, 2021). Amnesty International reports that torture methods include "beatings, electric shocks, stress positions, the unlawful use of restraints (including being locked in a tiger chair), sleep deprivation, being hung from a wall, being subjected to extremely cold temperatures, and solitary confinement" (Gunter, China has created a dystopian hellscape in Xinjiang, Amnesty report says, 2021).
Often, detainees are separated from their children, who are obliged to stay in orphanages managed by the Communist party. Moreover, Uyghur parents living abroad cannot contact their children and they typically avoid travelling to Xinjiang as they fear being arrested (Maizland, 2021).
The Communist party’s version
Chinese government officials publicly stated that the “vocational training centers” were created to teach Mandarin and vocational skills and to educate citizens about Chinese laws, ultimately preventing them from becoming susceptible to extremist ideas. Beijing repeatedly denied the accusations of violence and abuses, and Chinese leadership declared that re-education and training are helping minorities by giving them the tools to become more employable and play a part in the economy. Indeed, the Communist party maintains that these measures are necessary to tackle poverty and they have favored significant improvements in the economic situation in Xinjiang. The government also stated that its actions against extremism in the region are in compliance “with the principles and spirit of a series of international counter-terrorism resolutions, including the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy” (Regencia, 2021). Considering the absence of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang since late 2016, party officials claim that the training centers have been effective in preventing violence. Furthermore, in late 2019 Xinjiang’s governor declared that all detainees had graduated and that the individuals who were still in the camps were there by choice.
However, satellite images show that detention centers have been built or expanded since then, and rights groups denounced that many minority citizens were actually transferred to regular prisons with increasingly severe sentences, joining the thousands already in custody. Indeed, the New York Times and others report that incarceration rates rose remarkably in Xinjiang in 2017 and 2018, while Chinese government data reveal that the region, which is home to only 1.5% of the Chinese population, accounted for 21% of criminal arrests in the country in 2017 (Gunter, Uyghur imams targeted in China's Xinjiang crackdown, 2021).
The Chinese government also run a campaign aimed at threatening, harassing, and publicly smearing in press conferences or state media videos the people who made allegations of violence and sexual abuse in Xinjiang’s camps, especially women (Gunter, The cost of speaking up against China, 2021).
Economic factors and reactions from the Western world
It should also be noted that, according to many international observers, economic factors are involved in this crackdown. In fact, Xinjiang accounts for one sixth of China’s landmass, it produces almost one fifth of world cotton, and it contains the largest coal and natural gas reserves in the country. Due to its location, the region represents a key link to Central Asia and Europe in the Belt and Road Initiative promoted by Xi Jinping. Therefore, the Communist leadership is determined to prevent any separatist activity in the area in order to enhance its development and carry out its transformation into a hub of textile and apparel manufacturing. This project relies on the contribution of forced labor coming from detention camps and from more than eighty thousands previously detained Uyghurs throughout the country. This has been addressed through the imposition of trade restrictions by foreign governments. For example, the United States prohibited cotton and tomato imports from Xinjiang, while the United Kingdom announced fines for firms that do not prove the absence of forced labor in their supply chains. In addition, various Western companies eliminated cotton produced in the region from their supply chains (Maizland, 2021) (BBC, 2021).
The US also blacklisted dozens of agencies related to the abuses and it imposed sanctions on Chinese officials, together with the EU, UK, and Canada. As a retaliatory measure, lawmakers, institutions, and researchers in these countries were hit by sanctions imposed by Beijing (Gunter, China has created a dystopian hellscape in Xinjiang, Amnesty report says, 2021).
International pressure increased remarkably in early 2021, when the then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo declared that China’s treatment of Uyghurs constitutes a crime against humanity and it amounts to genocide, defined as the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group" under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (BBC, 2021). Similar statements were also issued by the Biden administration and by the Canadian and Dutch parliaments. Although various foreign leaders, human rights organizations, EU and UN officials called for the end of the repression, Beijing has denied any violation of human rights so far and it accused Uyghur militants of engaging in violent actions in separatist campaigns (BBC, 2021). Due to the existence of significant economic ties, most Western governments find it impossible to ban business with China entirely; this situation is further complicated by the extensive sanctions already imposed on Russia following its invasion of Ukraine and by the existence of important links between Moscow and Beijing.
Beijing’s partners and the Arab world
China’s closest partners, on the other hand, have generally opted to prioritize their valuable economic relationships and strategic links with Beijing, thus ignoring the abuses inflicted on Muslim minorities. Many countries have even actively assisted China in its persecution of the minority. For instance, in 2015 Thailand gave in to Chinese pressure and decided to repatriate more than one hundred Uyghurs who had escaped Xinjiang. Overall, it appears that several Arab countries (such as Morocco, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Syria) have detained or deported to China almost 300 Uyghurs since 2002. In addition, in July 2019 almost forty countries (including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia) signed a statement applauding Beijing for its “remarkable achievements” in human rights and its endeavor against “counterterrorism” in the region (Maizland, 2021) (Jardine, 2022).
The United Arab Emirates, in particular, is one of China’s main partners in the Arab world and it has been turning into a regional intelligence hub which provides Beijing with biometric data and other forms of identification belonging to Uyghur residents. Moreover, as China and Saudi Arabia consolidate their ties in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, Uyghur emigrants find themselves in greater danger, as highlighted by the imminent deportation of two individuals from Riyadh to Xinjiang.
Legal prosecution and future prospects
The Chinese government has recently been criticized for repeteadly abusing bilateral extradition treaties and the Interpolsystem, as in the case of the detention of Idris Hasan in Morocco in 2021. Beijing’s misuse of the system reflects the risks stemming from international policing cooperation with states that fail to respect the Rule of Law (Jardine, 2022) (Safeguard Defenders, 2021).
In 2021, Agnès Callamard, Secretary General of Amnesty International, urged the United Nations to investigate China’s repression of Muslim minorities in Xinjiang, while also accusing the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres of “failing to act according to his mandate”. The rights group also declared that detention centers in the region seem to operate “outside the scope of the Chinese criminal justice system or other known domestic law”, thus enhancing the international pressure faced by Beijing (Gunter, China has created a dystopian hellscape in Xinjiang, Amnesty report says, 2021). Despite this, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will be prosecuted by an international legal body, due to the fact that the country is not a signatory to the International Criminal Court and it holds veto power over cased initiated by the International Court of Justice. Indeed, in late 2020 the latter announced that it would not open a case (Gunter, China has created a dystopian hellscape in Xinjiang, Amnesty report says, 2021).
If Washington wants to stop these abuses, it should extensively exploit its powers to sanction security officials engaged in unlawful refoulement granted in the US Magnitsky Act.
Besides, the Biden administration should persuade its allies in the Arab world to join its struggle against repression, and it could also accord Uyghur refugees protected status and increase refugee quotas. This would be especially important considering that Chinese surveillance efforts usually affect minorities in like-minded autocracies (Jardine, 2022).
Bibliography
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